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Courts often look to existing social norms to resolve difficult questions 
in Fourth Amendment law. In theory, these norms can provide an objective 
basis for courts’ constitutional decisions, grounding Fourth Amendment law 
in familiar societal attitudes and beliefs. In reality, however, social norms can 
shift rapidly, are constantly being contested, and frequently reflect outmoded 
and discriminatory concepts. This Article draws on contemporary 
sociological literatures on norms and technology to reveal how courts’ 
reliance on norms leads to several identifiable errors in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
Courts assessing social norms generally adopt what we call the closure 
principle, or the idea that social norms can be permanently settled. Meanwhile, 
courts confronting new technologies often adopt the nonintervention principle, 
or the idea that courts should refrain from addressing the Fourth 
Amendment implications of new surveillance practices until the relevant 
social norms become clear. Both of these approaches are flawed, and they 
have substantial negative effects for equality and privacy. By adopting norms 
perceived as closed, courts may embed antiquated norms in Fourth 
Amendment law—norms that often involve discrimination on the basis of 
race, gender, or class. By declining to intervene when norms are undeveloped, 
courts cede power over norm creation to companies that design new 
technologies based on data-extractive business models. Further, judicial 
norm-reliance and nonintervention facilitate surveillance creep, where 
familiar data-gathering infrastructures are used for new types of surveillance 
and monitoring.  
 This Article provides, for the first time, a full, critical account of the 
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role of social norms in Fourth Amendment law. It details and challenges 
courts’ reliance on social norms in virtually every aspect of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. And it explores potential new directions for 
Fourth Amendment law, including novel doctrinal paradigms, different 
conceptions of stare decisis in the Fourth Amendment context, and 
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Social norms play a central role in Fourth Amendment law. The 
Supreme Court has emphasized the “great significance given to widely shared 
social expectations” and “social practice,” which can act as “a foundation of 
Fourth Amendment rights.”1 Indeed, for Fourth Amendment purposes, our 
“[e]xpectations of privacy are established by general social norms.”2 Courts’ 
assessments of norms drive outcomes in every aspect of Fourth Amendment 
law, including searches,3 seizures,4 reasonable suspicion,5 consent to search,6 
and special needs inspections performed without probable cause.7  
Social norms are the informal standards of conduct or widely accepted 
behaviors that characterize a given community.8 As such, they can give courts 
an ostensibly objective basis for their Fourth Amendment decisions, 
 
1 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111, 113 (2006). See also, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 
128, 143 n.12 (1978) (stating that reasonable expectations of privacy “must have a source 
outside of the Fourth Amendment,” one grounded either in property ownership or in 
“understandings that are recognized and permitted by society”). 
2 Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 428 (1981) (plurality op.), overruled on other grounds by 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). See also, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 9 
(2013) (basing its holding on the “background social norms” that govern approaches to the 
front door of a home). 
3 E.g., Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98–99 (1990). 
4 E.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 205–06 (2002). 
5 E.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000). 
6 E.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006). 
7 E.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535–36 (1967). 
8 Sanford Labovitz & Robert Hagedorn, Measuring Social Norms, 16 PACIFIC SOC. REV. 183, 
184 (1973) (stating that social norms are standards of conduct that “should or should not be 
followed”). See also C.A. Harwell Wells, The End of the Affair? Anti-Dueling Laws and Social 
Norms in Antebellum America, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1805, 1809 (2001) (providing that norms are 
activities “society holds that people should do”); ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 7 
(2000) (positing that social norms are imitative behavioral patterns grounded in cooperative 
relationships). Most legal scholars tie social norms to the prospect of informal social 
sanctions. See Richard McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 338, 340 (1999) (stating that norms are “informal social regularities that individuals feel 
obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of duty, because of fear of external 
nonlegal sanctions, or both.”); Robert Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 






grounding their rulings in longstanding societal practices that people know 
and understand. Courts relying on social norms do not, in other words, start 
from scratch—they identify and adopt existing societal attitudes towards 
surveillance or police behavior and use those attitudes to chart the course of 
constitutional law.9 The conventional account of social norms in Fourth 
Amendment law largely supports their use whenever feasible.10  
This Article challenges the conventional account and gives a fuller and 
more nuanced picture of courts’ reliance on social norms in Fourth 
Amendment law. It shows the dangers of the Fourth Amendment’s current 
course, which ultimately privileges the data-extractive interests of technology 
companies and government entities over individual rights.  
Currently, most courts assessing social norms approach them in one of 
two ways. When courts perceive that relevant social norms are stable, they 
adopt what we are calling the closure principle, or the idea that social norms can 
become more or less settled. In these situations, courts frequently apply 
social norms to resolve Fourth Amendment cases. When courts perceive that 
relevant social norms have not yet stabilized, they adopt what we call the 
nonintervention principle, or the idea that courts should decline to weigh in on 
new surveillance practices until the relevant social norms become clear. In 
these situations, courts generally refrain from addressing the Fourth 
Amendment implications of new technologies whenever possible. These 
approaches are exemplified by the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Ontario 
v. Quon,11 which involved the warrantless inspection of the text messages of 
government employees.12 The Court explicitly refused to consider “far-
reaching” issues raised by new surveillance-enhancing technologies, arguing 
that the judiciary “risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth 
Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in society 
has become clear.”13   
This Article’s analysis, drawing on the contemporary sociological 
literature on norms and technology, reveals the flaws inherent in courts’ 
current approaches. Social norms are neither immutable nor independent of 
sociolegal institutions. They are constantly being contested, and even 
 
9 See infra Part I.B. 
10 See infra Part I.A. 
11 560 U.S. 746 (2010). 
12 Id. at 750. 





seemingly stable norms are susceptible to gradual or rapid change.14 
Moreover, law has the capacity to alter social norms by expressing values that 
influence attitudes and behavior. The expressive force of early laws limiting 
where people could smoke cigarettes eventually altered social norms around 
smoking, providing the impetus for greater restrictions.15 Anti-sodomy laws, 
though largely unenforced, shaped social norms by stigmatizing gay people—
and their repeal by the Supreme Court in 2003 helped to promote norms 
favoring equality and acceptance.16 In neither case were existing social norms 
“closed,” and law played a vital role in shaping and improving norms going 
forward. 
Law also generates and influences norms surrounding new 
technologies. Technologies are themselves socially constructed, as users 
adapt them to existing social structures in unpredictable ways and shape their 
future development. The car, the telephone, the internet, the smartphone, 
and countless apps and other software have been shaped in profound ways 
by law and social processes.17  
Leveraging these insights, we identify substantial flaws in Fourth 
Amendment paradigms that rely on existing social norms or wait for them to 
settle before intervening. First, courts adopting existing social norms can 
entrench ideas that are outmoded and discriminatory.18 Norms regarding 
police-citizen interactions, which encourage voluntary interaction with police 
officers and compliance with police demands, can have racially 
discriminatory impacts.19 Norms involving domestic privacy and appropriate 
social behavior may have disparate gender impacts and can make it more 
 
14 See infra Part II.A. 
15 See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 607, 611 (2000) (discussing how law’s incremental approach to regulating cigarettes 
effectively changed norms around smoking). 
16 See infra Part II.A; Nan D. Hunter, Sexual Orientation and the Paradox of Heightened Scrutiny, 
102 MICH. L. REV. 1528, 1536 (2004); Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries 
Inflicted by “Unenforced” Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103 (2000); William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Law and the Construction of the Closet: American Regulation of Same-Sex Intimacy, 
1880–1946, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1007, 1069 (1997); Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act 
and Identity in and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1729 (1993). See also Jason 
Mazzone, When Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law’s Expressive Function, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
1039, 1041 (1999) (suggesting sodomy laws are paradigms of law’s expressive value). 
17 See infra Part II.B. 
18 See infra Part III.A. 





difficult for authorities to prevent domestic abuse.20 And norms surrounding 
workplace behavior and residential buildings can discriminate against poorer 
citizens or those with unstable employment situations.21 In several important 
cases, courts have based their Fourth Amendment rulings on dominant social 
practices without asking why those practices exist. In doing so, they have 
often embedded discriminatory norms into constitutional law.  
Second, courts that decline to intervene until norms have settled 
encourage unfettered government surveillance and cede norm creation to 
data-extractive technology companies. Proponents of nonintervention justify 
judicial neutrality by suggesting that sociotechnical norms should settle 
organically, as users and designs adapt to each other, without the judiciary 
putting a thumb on the scale.22 But a thumb is already on the scale. In 
practice, sociotechnical norms are not organically generated by autonomous 
individuals. They are filtered through the economic interests of the most 
powerful actors in the field: the companies that design those technologies. 
Their business models are based on the idea that data is profit, or what 
scholars have called “surveillance capitalism” or “informational capitalism.”23 
These companies carefully design and market products to encourage sharing, 
to nudge consumer behavior toward disclosure, and to desensitize users to 
the potential harms of surveillance. These processes influence the 
development of sociotechnical norms, pushing them toward greater 
acceptance of surveillance and the devaluation of privacy. By declining to get 
involved in the business of norm generation, courts allow sociotechnical 
norms to develop in ways that align with data-extractive interests. 
Further, if courts wait for sociotechnical norms to stabilize before 
regulating the government’s use of new surveillance technologies, they will 
allow many forms of surveillance to go unchecked.24 Social norms rarely 
 
20 See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111–13. 
21 See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984). Compare Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 
1670 (2018) (holding that police officers could not enter the curtilage of a home without a 
warrant), with United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a 
tenant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in an apartment hallway against police 
presence in his hallway regardless of whether the police were trespassing). 
22 E.g., Quon v. City of Ontario, 560 U.S. 747, 759 (2010).  
23 See SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM (2019); JULIE COHEN, 
BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER (2019). 
24 Cf. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 476, 526 (2011) (arguing that “[t]he Supreme Court should generally decline to review 





definitively settle, and it may take several years or decades for technologies 
and norms to stabilize even partially.25  Until they do, the government will 
have free reign to surveil citizens—and the cycle will begin anew with each 
new form of technology. 
Finally, judicial nonintervention facilitates “surveillance creep,” where 
existing data-gathering technologies are used for new types of surveillance 
and information collection. For instance, the establishment of traffic cameras 
on public streets makes it easier for the government to gather facial 
recognition data on passersby, because the mechanism for this surveillance 
is already in place.26 Surveillance creep can also have a powerful impact on 
social norms around technology because of its ability to normalize new 
surveillance as merely an extension of existing practices. Courts have been 
vulnerable to this effect, often treating invasive new surveillance practices as 
benign because they use familiar surveillance infrastructures.27 
Norms may still have a place in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 
despite these serious concerns. But rather than simply adopting norms they 
perceive are settled, courts must question whether those norms are 
justifiable. And courts that choose not to intervene when confronted with 
new data-gathering technologies should appreciate the pro-surveillance 
effects of nonintervention.  
Based on our analysis, we explore new directions for Fourth 
Amendment law that can allow courts to intervene effectively in novel cases 
and avoid reliance on existing norms. Alternative paradigms of Fourth 
Amendment law could encourage courts to look ahead at the effects of 
surveillance rather than looking back at outmoded norms. Courts could 
embed flexibility in Fourth Amendment law by expressly limiting the force 
of stare decisis for decisions addressing new technologies, where rapid 
contextual change is the rule rather than the exception. Finally, alternative 
institutional arrangements for regulating government surveillance could be 
adopted, with legislatures and administrative agencies working alongside 
 
its societal implications have stabilized.”). 
25 See infra Part III.B.1. 
26 See infra Part III.C.  
27 See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (holding that undercover agents could 
record conversations inside a suspect’s home on the basis of prior cases permitting agents 
without recording devices); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(ruling that agents could use a device to monitor an individual’s internet and email traffic 





courts to comprehensively address new surveillance technologies. Together, 
these novel approaches can help realize the promise of the Fourth 
Amendment as a shield against government overreach in an era of rapidly 
evolving surveillance technologies. 
Our concerns about judicial adoption of the closure and 
nonintervention principles are not strictly academic. Their continued use in 
Fourth Amendment law poses particular risks today. State and local 
governments have recently deployed industry-designed contact tracing apps 
to monitor Covid-19 outbreaks, with little infrastructure in place to guard 
against government use of the apps’ data for surveillance purposes.28  Cities 
are repurposing streetlight traffic cameras to surveil protesters and other law 
enforcement targets.29 Moreover, at a time when many institutions are finally 
reckoning with the nation’s legacies of racism and sexism, Fourth 
Amendment law’s continued embrace of antiquated norms is ripe for reform. 
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I surveys the conventional 
theoretical account of social norms in Fourth Amendment law. It then 
describes several cases across many areas that expressly rely on such norms 
to determine the scope and content of the Fourth Amendment. Part II 
examines the sociological literature on norms and the law’s role in shaping 
them. It describes the phenomenon of social construction of technology and 
defines and critiques the closure principle. Part III challenges the widespread 
use of social norms in Fourth Amendment law. It evaluates the 
discriminatory effects of existing norms used in several prominent cases and 
analyzes the legal and social harms of judicial nonintervention in contexts 
involving new technologies. Part IV explores potential new directions for 
Fourth Amendment law that rely less heavily on social norms. It sets out 
several alternative approaches, including new doctrinal approaches, more 
flexible conceptions of stare decisis in cases involving new technologies, and 
unconventional institutional regimes for regulating government surveillance.     
I. SOCIAL NORMS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The following sections review the conventional account of the role of 
social norms in Fourth Amendment law. They examine some of the most 
prominent cases that rely on norms to determine the scope or application of 
 
28 See infra note 251 and accompanying text. 





the Fourth Amendment. They also describe the common judicial practice of 
declining to intervene when norms surrounding a new technology are still in 
flux. As this Part demonstrates, when courts perceive that norms are stable, 
they generally adopt the closure principle; when courts perceive that norms 
are unsettled, they generally adopt the nonintervention principle. 
A. The Conventional Account of Social Norms  
The conventional wisdom in Fourth Amendment law largely endorses 
the use of social norms whenever possible. When identifiable social norms 
exist, courts can draw on them as an objective, external basis for Fourth 
Amendment doctrine.30 Social norms sometimes may be difficult to discern, 
but correctly identified norms offer useful guidance in an otherwise difficult 
area of law.31  
Legally relevant social norms are generally thought to arise from social 
practices that become accepted, repeated, and routinized over time.32 When 
people consider a prevalent social practice to be justified and beneficial, it 
gains a normative edge, and may be associated with social pressures to 
comply and informal sanctions for non-compliance.33 These social norms 
may eventually be embedded as law.34 In the commercial law context, this 
often takes the form of incorporating longstanding customs into the 
common law of trade and contract.35 A similar process can be observed in 
Fourth Amendment law, as norms of privacy and law enforcement practice 
 
30 See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111, 113 (2006) (stating that the Court gives 
“great significance … to widely shared social expectations” and “social practice[s],” which 
can act as “a foundation of Fourth Amendment rights.”); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 
n.12 (1978) (noting that reasonable expectations of privacy “must have a source outside of 
the Fourth Amendment,” one grounded either in property ownership or in social norms, 
defined as “understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.”);  Jed Rubenfeld, 
The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 107 (2008); William C. Heffernan, Fourth Amendment 
Privacy Interests, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 37 (2001).  
31 Heffernan, supra note 30, at 37. 
32 Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Decentralizing Fourth Amendment Search Doctrine, 107 KY. 
L.J. 169, 195 (2018). 
33 Id. at 196; Heffernan, supra note 30, at 43–44. 
34 Mannheimer, supra note 32, at 197–99; see also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 
(1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Our expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part 
reflections of laws that translate into rules the customs and values of the past and present.”). 





are gradually codified as constitutional law.36 
Social norms may be difficult to identify, and the Supreme Court has 
given little guidance on how to assess norms for Fourth Amendment 
purposes.37 Moreover, the Court’s assessments of norms can be criticized as 
inaccurate or biased in favor of the government.38 But at least where the 
Justices perceive that norms are settled, the Court has frequently used them 
to determine the contours of Fourth Amendment law.39  
By contrast, in cases involving new technologies where social norms 
and practices have not yet reached maturity, judges and scholars have argued 
for caution. 40 In these situations, the conventional account suggests it may 
be more prudent for courts to avoid deciding Fourth Amendment questions 
whenever possible.41 As the Supreme Court has warned, “[t]he judiciary risks 
error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of 
emerging technology before its role in society has become clear.”42 Caution 
may be especially justified, according to this account, when a technology and 
the social practices surrounding it continue to change rapidly.43 In contexts 
where “it is uncertain how … norms, and the law’s treatment of them, will 
evolve,” courts may avoid ruling broadly on Fourth Amendment issues and 
allow social norms and practices to settle before intervening.44 Only Justice 
Scalia disagreed with this account of the role of norms in technology cases, 
and even he, in other contexts, expressly endorsed the use of social norms in 
setting the boundaries of Fourth Amendment protection.45 
 
36 Rubenfeld, supra note 30, at 107; Heffernan, supra note 30, at 37.  
37 Heffernan, supra note 30, at 37. 
38 Blitz, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1415. 
39 See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010) (describing how the Court in Katz 
used its knowledge and experience of telephone practices to identify a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in phone calls); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12 (1978) (“Legitimation of 
expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either 
by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are 
recognized and permitted by society.”); Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111–113 (noting the central 
importance of social understandings and practices to Fourth Amendment consent 
doctrines); Kerr, supra note 24, at 539. 
40 Quon, 560 U.S. at 759; Kerr, supra note 24, at 540. 
41 See supra note 40. 
42 Quon, 560 U.S. at 759. 
43 Id. (“Rapid changes in the dynamics of communication and information transmission are 
evident not just in the technology itself but in what society accepts as proper behavior.”). 
44 Id. 





B. The Jurisprudence of Social Norms 
Courts decide Fourth Amendment cases using a variety of doctrines, 
precedents, and policy considerations. Social norms alone do not dictate 
every Fourth Amendment outcome. However, when social norms or 
practices are relevant to the issue at hand, courts frequently rely on them to 
determine the course of Fourth Amendment law. This happens most often 
when courts perceive those norms to be settled, stable, or “closed”. 
The Supreme Court has itself characterized social norms as an objective 
basis for the Fourth Amendment’s scope. A Fourth Amendment search 
occurs when government officials violate a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.46 The Court has stated that reasonable expectations of privacy “must 
have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment,” one grounded either in 
property ownership or in social norms, defined as “understandings that are 
recognized and permitted by society.”47 In another case, a plurality of Justices 
stated directly that “[e]xpectations of privacy are established by general social 
norms.”48 Lower courts and leading Fourth Amendment treatises have 
echoed this statement, expressly tying the Fourth Amendment to 
assessments of social norms.49  
The Supreme Court, for example, has drawn a line between houseguests 
 
at 9 (“Here, the background social norms that invite a visitor to the front door do not invite 
him there to conduct a search.”). 
46 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The Supreme 
Court has recently adopted a separate test that also finds a Fourth Amendment search when 
a government official physically intrudes on property for the purpose of gathering 
information. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7–10 (2013); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 
400, 404–06 (2012). In practice, this has added little to the Katz test, and the Supreme Court 
cases where it has been employed may have reached the same outcome under Katz. See 
Jardines, 569 U.S. at 12–16 (Kagan, J., concurring); Jones, 565 U.S. at 418–31 (Alito, J., 
concurring in the judgment).   
47 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978). 
48 Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 428 (1981) (plurality op.), overruled by United States 
v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).  
49 See, e.g., Raynor v. State, No. 69, 2014 WL 4216019, at *6 (Md. Aug. 27, 2014) (“[C]ommon 
experience and social norms bear upon our assessment of whether one has an objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular item or place. Expectations of privacy are 
established by general social norms.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); 1 WAYNE 
R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.1(d), at 587 (5th ed. 2012) (“[I]t is necessary to look 
to the customs and values of the past and present, the structure of society, the patterns of 





with privacy rights and houseguests without such rights based on its 
assessments of social norms. In Minnesota v. Olson,50 the Court concluded that 
an overnight houseguest could challenge a police search of his friend’s 
house.51 The opinion engaged in a lengthy analysis of established social 
customs and practices, ultimately concluding that homeowners hosting their 
friends for an overnight visit typically grant their guests a measure of control 
and privacy within their home.52 The norms are different, however, for 
shorter duration guests, and the Fourth Amendment accordingly offers them 
less protection.53 The Court’s detailed analyses of the social roles of host and 
houseguest provided the foundation for the these Fourth Amendment 
rulings. This pattern recurs in numerous Fourth Amendment scope cases.54 
 
50 495 U.S. 91 (1990). 
51 Id. at 93. 
52 Among other things, the Court stated that:   
Staying overnight in another’s home is a longstanding social custom that 
serves functions recognized as valuable by society. We stay in others’ homes 
when we travel to a strange city for business or pleasure, when we visit our 
parents, children, or more distant relatives out of town, when we are in 
between jobs or homes, or when we house-sit for a friend … It is unlikely that 
the guest will be confined to a restricted area of the house; and when the host 
is away or asleep, the guest will have a measure of control over the premises 
… The point is that hosts will more likely than not respect the privacy interests 
of their guests, who are entitled to a legitimate expectation of privacy despite 
the fact that they have no legal interest in the premises and do not have the 
legal authority to determine who may or may not enter the household. 
Id. at 98–99. 
53 See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90–91 (1998).  The Carter Court concluded that there 
was no identifiable social custom or norm that would extend the full protections of the home 
to a person who was merely present for a short time. Id. at 90–91.  
54 In Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1529 (2018), the Court held that a driver who 
borrowed a rented car with the permission of the renter had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the car because social norms dictate that a friend might use a car for a variety of 
legitimate reasons. Id at 1527–29. Social norms also play a central role in the leading case 
applying trespass concepts to determine the Fourth Amendment’s scope. For instance, 
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8-9, 11–12 (2013), relied on the “background social norms that 
invite a visitor to the front door” to hold that police officers violated a defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment rights when they approached his front door with a drug-sniffing dog. See also, 
e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000) (determining that an officer’s squeezing and 
manipulating the carry-on bag of a bus passenger went beyond socially acceptable practices 
and was therefore a Fourth Amendment search); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100, 
105 (holding that a defendant had no Fourth Amendment right in another’s handbag where 
he had not known her well prior to the search); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 





Likewise, in Fourth Amendment consent cases, the Court gives “great 
significance … to widely shared social expectations” and “social practice[s],” 
which can act as “a foundation of Fourth Amendment rights.”55 Thus a 
police officer can enter a house with the permission of only one co-tenant, 
because “customary social usage” permits such entry.56 But if another tenant 
is present and objects, “commonly held understanding[s] about the authority 
that co-inhabitants may exercise” dictate that the officer cannot enter.57 
Entering a house over the objection of a tenant would violate social norms 
of propriety.58 
A similar reliance on social norms occurs in cases involving non-
physical seizures.59 The norms that govern public buses, workplaces, and 
interactions with police officers often determine whether a person has been 
seized or not under the Fourth Amendment.60  
Finally, courts assessing the reasonableness of searches and seizures 
often rely on social norms.61 The Supreme Court has implicitly endorsed this 
practice, noting that the reasonableness of a stop-and-frisk “must be based 
on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.”62 Social 
norms and practices play a pivotal role in other reasonableness cases as well, 
especially cases involving administrative searches or suspicionless drug 
testing in state-controlled settings.63  
 
communication.”). 
55 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111, 113 (2006). 
56 Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 303 (2014). 
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The Supreme Court, and courts in general, do not overtly assess social 
norms in every Fourth Amendment case. But when norms are relevant and 
clear, courts often use them in shaping Fourth Amendment law. This process 
is complicated, however, when courts attempt to address new technologies 
that are not yet associated with established social norms or practices. 
C.  Contested Social Norms and Judicial Nonintervention 
New technologies pose some of the most difficult issues in Fourth 
Amendment law.64 Modern devices and services also present a variety of 
complex issues involving social norms and practices.65 For instance, whether 
information disclosed to dating apps, smart-home devices, social media, or 
internet service providers is protected by the Fourth Amendment may 
depend on the social customs surrounding those technologies.66 In the face 
of these complexities, courts have often struggled to effectively apply the 
Fourth Amendment to new technological contexts.67 
When courts perceive that social norms surrounding a technology have 
begun to harden, however, they have eagerly turned to them as objective 
bases for their decisions.68 For example, in Katz v. United States,69 the Supreme 
Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the warrantless 
recording of telephone calls, with the majority emphasizing “the vital role 
that the public telephone has come to play in private communication.”70 By 
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the time Katz was decided in 1967, it was clear that a person who entered a 
telephone booth, shut its door, and paid to use the phone was entitled to 
privacy—if not against visual observation, then against “the uninvited ear.”71 
The Court’s assessment came several decades after the telephone was 
popularized, when the social role of the telephone was relatively stable and 
mature.72  
In recent years, the Court has made similar assessments about the 
ubiquity and social role of cell phones. Riley v. California,73 which ruled that 
cell phones could not be searched incident to arrest, was based on the Court’s 
findings that most people depend on their cell phones and carry them 
wherever they go, sometimes even in the shower.74 Moreover, given the way 
people use cell phones—to send personal communications, store 
photographs, browse the internet, set their personal schedules, download an 
average of 33 apps per user—they tend to contain the privacies of life.75 The 
Court relied on a similar analysis in Carpenter v. United States76 to hold that the 
Fourth Amendment required police to obtain a warrant before tracking cell 
phone signals.77  
However, in cases involving new technologies around which social 
practices were still indeterminate, the Court has taken a more cautious 
approach. In Kyllo v. United States,78 the Court found that the use of infrared 
camera technology to scan a home required a warrant.79 The Court added the 
caveat that its decision applied when the technology at issue was not “in 
general public use.”80 Were the technology in general use, the social norms 
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and practices surrounding it would be different, and accordingly people 
might not reasonably expect privacy in their homes.81  
In City of Ontario v. Quon,82 the Court declined to rule at all on whether 
text messages sent from workplace phones are protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.83 It expressly warned of the difficulties of addressing a new 
technology “before its role in society has become clear.”84 When a 
technology is mature and its social role is more defined, the Justices can rely 
on their own knowledge and experience to determine the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment.85 But here, “[r]apid changes in the dynamics of communication 
and information transmission are evident not just in the technology itself but 
in what society accepts as proper behavior.”86 Because it was uncertain how 
the relevant social norms would evolve, the Court declined to weigh in.87  
The Supreme Court’s caution in addressing new technologies not 
associated with clear social norms is also reflected in its reluctance to take 
cases involving such technologies. Despite the ongoing proliferation of 
information and surveillance technologies in the digital era, the Court has 
decided relatively few Fourth Amendment cases outside of traditional law 
enforcement contexts.88 In recent years, the Court has declined to review 
cases involving a wide variety of novel technologies, including surveillance 
 
81 See Kerr, supra note 24, at 541. 
82 560 U.S. 747 (2010). 
83 See id. at 758–59. The Court did resolve the case on narrower grounds, holding that, even 
if the Fourth Amendment protected work text messages, the search of Quon’s messages 
were justified by the special needs of his workplace and the non-criminal purpose of the 
initial review of his messages. Id. at 760–61. 
84 Id. at 759. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. (“At present, it is uncertain how workplace norms, and the law’s treatment of them, 
will evolve.”). 
88 For an example of this phenomenon in the Fourth Amendment search context, which is 
especially affected by new surveillance technologies, see Matthew Tokson, The Emerging 





cameras,89 web surfing tracking,90 email to/from data,91 real-time cell phone 
tracking,92 cell tower simulators,93 cell tower dumps involving the disclosure 
of every user proximate to a cell tower,94 images uploaded to a photo storage 
site,95 and internet subscriber information.96 Even when the Court does 
resolve cases involving new technologies, it often resolves these cases on 
narrow grounds, explicitly limiting the impact of its reasoning for future 
cases.97 This has significant downstream effects. Lower courts regularly cite 
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the Supreme Court’s narrowing language as a basis for denying privacy rights 
in cases involving novel technologies not yet analyzed by the Court.98 
II. LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL NORMS 
As we have seen, courts often decide Fourth Amendment cases by 
looking to social norms. Courts assessing those norms typically perceive 
them as settled and unchanging. Taking social norms as received wisdom or 
as social facts of life is to adopt what we are calling the closure principle, or the 
idea that social norms can be definitively settled. This Part leverages the legal 
and sociological literatures on norms to argue that norms rarely permanently 
stabilize, and undergo frequent contestation and change. Further, norms are 
not prior to law and law has a critical role to play in nudging and creating 
new norms that challenge existing surveillance and enforcement practices. 
A.  Law’s Influence on Social Norms 
Social norms are neither immutable nor independent of the societal 
institutions they frame.99 They are constantly being contested and 
reevaluated.100 And even when they do seem to stabilize, norms are 
susceptible to nudges and, less frequently, shocks.101 Law has the capacity to 
alter social norms through its expressive force and ability to reshape behavior 
and social values.102 For example, laws about marriage influence ideas about 
gender, sex, and monogamy.103 Laws protecting digital civil rights arguably 
affect people’s perceptions of and willingness to engage in online 
harassment.104 And laws about police searches influence our perceptions of 
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privacy and uses of technology.105 In this section, we push back against 
judicial adoption of the closure principle by first describing the generative 
relationship between law and social norms and then showing how law plays 
a role in directly and indirectly defining technology’s place in society. 
Legal scholars used to assume that laws and norms were separate 
systems of social control.106 For example, Robert Ellickson’s groundbreaking 
study showing how residents of Shasta County, California resolved their 
disputes amongst themselves using extra-legal norms painted a picture of 
social norms as largely independent of law.107 Others suggested that law and 
norms played related, yet distinct roles in governing social and commercial 
transactions: “warm” social norms govern ongoing commercial relationships 
while “cold” law comes in as a last resort.108  
Scholars now understand that law plays a far more influential role. The 
modern consensus is that, more than just parallel systems of social control, 
norms and law influence each other. In particular, as Cass Sunstein argued, 
law is an instrument of norm production and guidance, influencing people’s 
behavior by indirectly signaling what society thinks is good or bad, moral or 
evil, appropriate or not.109 Law has an “expressive function,”110 not just a 
coercive one, that creates “cultural consequences.”111 Laws against flag 
burning, for example, are primarily expressive in character: If they ever were 
to pass, these laws would have insignificant coercive effects because flag 
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burning is exceedingly rare. Instead, supporters see flag burning laws as 
“statement[s] about the venality of the act of flag burning, perhaps in order 
to affect social norms.”112 Laws with more tangible direct effects, including 
environmental restrictions like the federal Endangered Species Act and local 
composting rules, are also expressive: they are “symbol[s] of a certain 
conception of the relationship between human beings and their 
environments” and hope to engender eco-friendly habitual human 
behavior.113 
Beyond their expressive function, law can affect norms in a variety of 
ways. Dan Kahan has argued that “gentle nudges” can incrementally change 
existing social norms by encouraging individuals to “revise upward their 
judgment of the degree of condemnation warranted by the conduct in 
question.”114 A law that tries to create or entrench new norms through severe, 
disproportionate punishments—what Kahan calls a “hard shove”—
however, could backfire. Law’s role in changing attitudes about smoking is a 
notable example of the efficacy of gentle nudges. Faced with a population 
for which smoking was not only ordinary but also celebrated on television, 
Congress moved slowly, first requiring warning labels and then banning 
television advertisements.115 These initial steps reflected a “segmentation 
strategy” that still respected individual autonomy but, at the same time, 
burdened that choice to smoke with symbolic condemnation.116 Over time, 
a steadily increasing number of restrictions on smoking—where people could 
smoke, how much they had to pay, and who could buy them—tapped into 
growing “resentment” from nonsmokers about the dangers of second-hand 
smoke that allowed the law to catalyze additional social sanctions, thereby 
helping norms around smoking to resettle at point far removed from a once 
pro-smoking culture.117 Had we assumed that norms around smoking had 
hardened in the 1950s, today’s television shows might still be sponsored by 
Philip Morris.  
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Law, especially in the form of a bright-line rule, also clarifies 
appropriate behavior when norms are vague. Elizabeth Scott gives the 
example of elementary and secondary school truancy laws.118 Scott notes that 
parents had always been subject to a vague norm about educating their 
children, but up until the early twentieth century, it had never been clear that 
good parenting necessarily meant keeping children in school throughout their 
childhood.119 Attendance laws changed that. After their passage, parents had 
a specific mandate around which they could structure their responsibilities 
for educating their children. Indeed, compulsory attendance laws were 
justified and sold to parents as ways to help them educate their children, 
create good citizens, and become good parents themselves.120 This education 
norm, clarified by a specific legal requirement, was eventually internalized as 
a hallmark of good parenting.121 
Alex Geisinger has argued that law can change our beliefs about both 
the morality and practical utility of activities by “providing information or by 
influencing the inferential reasoning process.”122 Laws that mandate that 
drivers wear seatbelts were effective at changing social norms because they 
came alongside publicized information about the dangers of riding without 
“buckling up.” Likewise, research has shown that public health interventions 
that focused on increasing awareness of the harms of smoking had a 
significant effect on smoking cessation rates.123  
On a more structural level, law is one of several social institutions that 
set discourses of power that influence our understanding, assumptions, and 
debates about social life. Discourses, as Michel Foucault explained, are the 
background knowledge, ideologies, assumptions, and modes of thought 
behind what we mean when we think and talk about a concept, from privacy 
to sexuality.124 For example, in describing social understandings of 
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homosexuality, Foucault argued that, at a given time in history, our 
conception of what homosexuality means is influenced by the ideas, 
arguments, and language from institutions like religion (which only recently 
started to see same-sex relationships and same-sex sodomy as anathematic to 
religious dogma) and science (which evolved from defining homosexuality as 
a disease and then, by the latter part of the Twentieth Century, the 
opposite).125 Law played a central role in defining queer people as “others,” 
as well. “As defined by the ancient civil or canonical codes, sodomy was a 
category of forbidden acts … .”126 Modern criminal approaches to sodomy, 
vagrancy laws, and unevenly enforced laws against public solicitation 
perpetuated bourgeois discourses that marginalized gay people as 
“abnormal” and kept them out of power.127 The feminist scholars Reva 
Siegal, Judith Butler, Kathleen Jones, and Catharine MacKinnon have made 
similar arguments about the way law—alongside medicine, religion, and 
politics—have constructed gender norms to marginalize women.128 Adopting 
the closure principle, then, can entrench the discourses of power embedded 
in society by other social groups.129 
Although all of the functional mechanisms of law’s expressive value 
seem to suggest that new laws generate new norms, repealing a law and 
deregulating some aspect of social life can just as effectively indicate old 
norms’ obsolescence and generate new social norms in their place. Since the 
Supreme Court held criminal sodomy laws unconstitutional in Lawrence v. 
Texas,130 for example, attitudes toward and support for queer equality have 
changed, with social norms generally favoring equality and more 
acceptance.131 Prior to Lawrence, the persistence of anti-sodomy laws 
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reinforced discriminatory social norms even in the absence of 
enforcement.132  “[E]ven when unenforced,” sodomy laws “express[ed] 
contempt for certain classes of citizens”133 by establishing gay people as 
presumptive criminals—or “scum,” to use the philosopher Richard Mohr’s 
term134—on the basis of their status and sexual identity alone. Janet Halley 
similarly argued that maintaining sodomy laws, and the associated debates 
about them, contribute to stigma and force people into the closet, stating that 
“[t]he role of law in constituting persons by providing a forum for their 
conflicts over who they shall be understood to be is deeply material, … it 
involves … the more subtle dynamics of representation.”135 Christopher 
Leslie went even further, demonstrating how sodomy laws did violence to 
queer psychological well-being, encouraged anti-queer violence, and enabled 
police harassment.136 These attacks were rationalized by sodomy law’s 
expressive function: if the law said gay people were presumptive criminals, 
then they did not deserve constitutional rights.137 Throughout, law played a 
central role in shaping social norms around homosexuality, first reinforcing 
hostile norms and then helping to generate more positive ones.   
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B.  Law and the Construction of Technology 
Law also creates and modifies norms around uses of new technologies. 
Smartphones, GPS, email, cloud storage, and almost any other digital 
technology at issue in Fourth Amendment cases are creations of social 
institutions rather than just creatures of code.138 The ways we use them and 
our expectations of privacy that attend those uses are no more “received 
wisdom” than other evolving social norms. Therefore, accepting norms 
around technology as stable before the law has its say is to deny law a place 
in what Science and Technology Studies (STS) call the “social construction 
of technology,” or SCOT, a process in which different social institutions fight 
to define technology’s place in society.139 
STS scholars argue that technologies are not just discovered or built out 
of raw materials or lines of code. Rather, technologies are constructed: they are 
the products of human relations, understood by people, and used in daily life 
in ways sometimes unintended by their designers. Technologies are social 
artifacts because they are used, changed, and repurposed by people and 
institutions long after they are put on the market.140 New technologies 
undergo a period of “interpretive flexibility” during which users have 
different understandings of how things work and the purpose they serve, 
vying to establish different social norms in the process.141 For example, when 
rural farmers, who initially resisted the automobile as a threat to their way of 
life, started using the Model T as a stationary power source on their farms, 
 
138 BRUNO LATOUR, THE PASTEURIZATION OF FRANCE (Alan Sheridan & John Law trans., 
1993); Michel Callon, Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the Scallops and 
the Fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay, in POWER, ACTION AND BELIEF: A NEW SOCIOLOGY OF 
KNOWLEDGE? 196–229 (John Law ed., 1987) (1984); Michel Callon, The Sociology of an Actor-
Network: The Case of the Electric Vehicle, in MAPPING THE DYNAMICS OF SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY 19–34 (Michel Callon et al. eds., 1986); BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN 
ACTION: HOW TO FOLLOW SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS THROUGH SOCIETY (1988). 
139 THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE 
SOCIOLOGY AND HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY (Wiebe E. Bijker et al. eds., 2012). 
140 Trevor J. Pinch & Wiebe E. Bijker, The Social Construction of Facts and Artefacts: Or How the 
Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each Other, in Wiebe E. Bijker, 
Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor Pinch eds., THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE SOCIOLOGY AND HISTORY OF 
TECHNOLOGY 17-50 (1987). 
141 See CYNTHIA COCKBURN & SUSAN ORMROD, GENDER AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE 





they became “agents of technological change.”142 Farmers used cars to power 
lights and machinery and to transport goods rather than people. Designers 
and manufacturers who resisted using the car as a simple power source tried 
to counteract this: they elevated the car’s rear wheels to make it difficult to 
double as a stable power source and built and marketed separate gasoline 
engines that could provide power when needed.143 As a result, farmers 
created norms that influenced the next iteration of the car and spurred the 
creation of new products.  
The telephone, surprisingly enough, was not intended to be a tool of 
social communication when it was first built. The enterprises that built the 
first phones designed them purely for businesses or government agencies to 
transmit information over long distances. As Michele Martin describes, rural 
women had a different idea. They used telephones to create the social contact 
they lacked under a patriarchal system that kept women in the home. Their 
norms forced changes in design of both the phones themselves and the wires 
that made communication possible.144 Bijker has shown that when the high-
wheeled bicycle was introduced, older men tried to establish a norm of 
nonuse, designating it as unsafe. This which paved the way for the 
development of a new, safer, smaller-wheeled bicycle several years later.145 In 
all of these contexts, consumers identified new uses for products that 
designers never intended, ultimately leading to changes in design.146 
Law is one of the social institutions involved in the social construction 
of technology. Law undoubtedly affects technology design. Intellectual 
property, tort, and products liability law, among other areas, directly affect 
how technologies are made. For instance, patent and copyright law 
encourages innovators to “invent around” or “create around” others’ designs 
and hold creators liable for infringement when they get too close to an 
existing product.147 Trade secrecy law influences how competing products are 
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designed: reverse engineering is permissible, but not if it is based on 
unlawfully obtained information.148 Tort law has generated a series of 
behavioral standards that define how companies design, manufacture, and 
market products.149  
We already see law directly influencing the designs and norms of 
information technologies, as well. When the information industry introduced 
end-to-end encryption and eliminated so-called “back doors” that 
governments could use to access information on smartphones and other 
platforms, the U.S. Department of Justice pushed back, citing national 
security concerns.150 Law enforcement attempted to use the All Writs Act to 
force Apple to design a “back door” into the iPhone owned by the domestic 
terrorist who killed 14 people at a San Bernardino community center in 
2015.151 The General Data Protection Regulation, the European Union’s 
comprehensive data privacy law, and the California Consumer Privacy Act, a 
structurally similar privacy law that took effect on January 1, 2020, both 
guarantee individuals the right to access information about them stored by 
data collectors.152 Those provisions have required companies to redesign 
their databases and user interfaces to allow data requests, searches, and 
transmission.153 In addition, as nations tried to use technology-enhanced 
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contact tracing to manage outbreaks during the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic, 
privacy law in Europe and privacy regulators in the United States facilitated 
the creation of decentralized tracing apps that preserved some level of 
privacy while allowing health experts to track Covid hotspots.154 
Privacy law does this as well by influencing norms around sharing and 
design. Danielle Citron has argued that creating special legal protections for 
sexual privacy can encourage people to value their privacy when downloading 
menstruation apps or disclosing HIV status on a dating app.155 One of us has 
written that privacy law could help generate and protect norms of trust 
among individuals.156 And Margot Kaminski has suggested that one of the 
goals of compliance requirements in the GDPR, including privacy impact 
assessments and other internal structures, is to nudge behavioral and design 
norms inside the information industry.157 These are just a few examples of 
how law is part of the process by which new technologies are interpreted, 
constructed, and understood in society. 
III. CHALLENGING NORM RELIANCE AND JUDICIAL 
NONINTERVENTION IN FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW  
Where norms seem stable and settled, they often define our Fourth 
Amendment rights; where norms appear to be in flux, they are left to evolve 
on their own, free of judicial intervention. That is our descriptive claim. In 
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weaken the ability of the Fourth Amendment to protect privacy, security, and 
equality in the information age. 
As discussed above, law not only draws on social norms but also shapes 
them, in an ongoing exchange between social institutions and individuals. 
Courts deciding Fourth Amendment cases have often failed to appreciate the 
expressive function of law and its role in driving norms. Courts regularly take 
norms to be settled, even in areas where they are contested or directly 
influenced by legal standards.  
This failure of understanding leads to concrete judicial errors in the 
Fourth Amendment context. First, courts may embed outmoded norms in 
Fourth Amendment law, even as many of those norms discriminate on the 
basis of race, gender, or class. Second, courts often refrain from addressing 
government surveillance when the norms surrounding a new technology are 
unsettled. This practice allows the government to surveil citizens without 
regulation for years or decades. Moreover, it cedes power over norm 
development to companies that design new technologies based on an 
extractive data-for-profit business model, thus skewing social norms toward 
disclosure and away from privacy. Finally, both the closure and 
nonintervention principles described above facilitate “surveillance creep,” 
where existing data-gathering structures are used for new types of 
surveillance.  
Relying on the sociolegal and STS literatures described above, we 
challenge the principles of closure and nonintervention that drive these 
judicial errors.  The following sections detail how courts have embedded 
discriminatory norms, ceded power over norm development to data-
extractive businesses, and failed to anticipate the gradual accretion of 
government surveillance infrastructure. 
A. The Problem of Discriminatory Norms 
 Social norms are rarely fully settled and are subject to contestation 
and change. Norms surrounding race, gender, class, and related issues are 
particularly likely to be challenged and to shift over time. Courts applying 
“settled” social norms are thus at risk of reifying outmoded, discriminatory 
concepts. This section explores this process, detailing how courts’ seemingly 
neutral applications of existing norms have embedded discriminatory ideas 





1. Racially Discriminatory Norms  
Courts basing Fourth Amendment law on prevailing social customs 
may entrench discriminatory norms that disadvantage citizens of color. In 
the Supreme Court’s norm-based Fourth Amendment cases, the Court often 
looks to social practices as an objective basis for rules governing police-
citizen interactions. Its assessments of prevailing social customs may be 
empirically accurate—most people may act as the Court predicts. But the 
very act of enshrining social norms in constitutional law can reinforce 
discriminatory norms and make it more difficult for citizens to challenge 
them.  
In Illinois v. Wardlow,158 the Court concluded that the police could stop-
and-frisk a Black suspect who ran away after seeing several police cars.159 The 
police made a “commonsense judgement[]…about human behavior,” the 
Court said, and found that running away from police was suspicious and 
indicative of wrongdoing.160 Several Justices in dissent pointed out that Black 
people have legitimate fears of police brutality and other harms stemming 
from police interaction that may cause them to flee at the sight of officers 
even without having done anything wrong.161 But the majority concluded that 
Wardlow’s fleeing behavior was sufficiently unusual as to arouse suspicion, 
and thus the officers’ actions were justified.162 
Empirical studies cast doubt on the idea that people fleeing the police 
are regularly engaged in wrongdoing.163 But the problem here is not the 
Court’s empirical conclusion about how usual it is for a person to run away 
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after seeing the police. It is the Court’s failure to question prevailing social 
practices of police-citizen interaction, particularly with respect to persons of 
color, before embedding them in constitutional law. Running away upon 
seeing a police officer is likely rare overall in part because of substantial racial 
disparities in police treatment of civilians.164 White people have less reason 
to fear police brutality or degradation, and thus less reason to run away.165 
Black people may decline to run away in most cases not because they are 
unafraid of the police but because they fear even more what the police will 
do to them if they flee.166 Declining to run may also reflect parental advice to 
children of color that discourages running in the view of a police officer and 
counsels maximal compliance in order to minimize the risk of being harmed 
by the police.167 The Court, in other words, bases Fourth Amendment law 
on a prevailing social practice without asking why that practice exists. Nor 
does it ask whether the law should work to change that practice. In doing so, 
it embeds into constitutional law a practice with racially disparate effects. 
In Drayton v. United States,168 several police officers boarded a 
Greyhound bus, guarding the exits, while one officer asked to search 
Drayton’s bag and pat-down his clothes.169 The Court’s conclusion that this 
was not a seizure rested on the idea that bus passengers would generally feel 
free to decline police requests to search their bags and would leave the bus if 
they wanted to terminate the encounter.170 The Court noted that most people 
complied with such requests, presumably out of a desire to promote law 
enforcement and enhance safety.171 Setting aside whether the Court was 
correct about the prevailing social practice of complying with police search 
requests, the Court failed to examine why this social norm exists.  
Like other members of traditionally marginalized groups, Black people 
may be especially reluctant to challenge police authority or decline police 
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requests in a situation like the one in Drayton, where Drayton, a Black man, 
was surrounded by officers in a confined space.172 Black children are often 
counseled by parents and other trusted figures to defer to the police as much 
as possible, not to move or flee, and to comply with every request.173 Thus a 
standard like Drayton’s, which depends on a person refusing to talk to police 
officers or brushing past them to leave a bus, may be harmful to people of 
color who cannot assert their rights to noncompliance with police requests 
without risking serious harm or trauma.174 Moreover, psychological studies 
of consent in law enforcement contexts suggest that the general norm of 
compliance with police search requests is motivated by intimidation rather 
than the voluntary choices of citizens.175  
Even if a court ultimately concludes that the coercive pressure of police 
bus interdiction is justified by the benefits of searching passengers’ bags,176 it 
cannot do so without addressing the disparate racial and ethnic impacts of 
such an approach.177 Yet the Court never grapples with these normative 
questions, instead choosing to identify a prevailing social practice and adopt 
it as settled.  
2. Gender-Discriminatory Norms  
Fourth Amendment standards that depend on individuals refusing to 
comply with police officers likewise disadvantage women relative to men. 
Survey data suggests that women feel less free to leave police-citizen 
encounters and may feel the coercive pressure of such encounters more than 
others.178 Linguistic patterns correlated with gender may also result in 
women, particularly women of color, being less direct with authority figures 
in ways that may disadvantage them under facially neutral standards of 
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normal police-citizen interaction.179 
Moreover, the jurisprudence of consent searches of homes may 
reinforce existing norms of domestic privacy at the expense of deterring 
domestic abuse. The multiple opinions in Georgia v. Randolph parallel an 
ongoing feminist debate about privacy and domestic abuse without actually 
addressing it.180 Some theorists have argued against the concept of domestic 
privacy, contending that it provides a cover for physical and psychological 
abuse.181 Others have argued that once the law takes a full account of the 
privacy and bodily integrity interests of women, the law’s general concern for 
domestic privacy need not shield abusers or prevent government officials 
from scrutinizing the home in appropriate circumstances.182 The Supreme 
Court largely elided this debate by focusing on social norms and concluding 
that prevailing norms discourage entering a dwelling when a tenant of that 
dwelling is present and objects to one’s entry.183 The Justices were aware of 
the domestic abuse issue at the time of their decision.184 But in setting a 
general standard, the Court concluded that it should follow its typical practice 
of giving “great significance … to widely shared social expectations” and 
“social custom” in Fourth Amendment consent cases.185  
Adopting these social norms, however well intentioned, enshrines them 
in constitutional law without fully addressing their gendered burdens and 
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implications for victims and survivors of abuse. While the police would be 
able to enter a house in situations of domestic violence, they may not, under 
Randolph, be able to do so in cases where violence is not imminent or where 
the signs of abuse are too ambiguous to allow for entry on the basis of an 
emergency aid exception.186 Likewise, the Randolph rule prohibits police 
involvement in cases of domestic strife that may act as a precursor to abuse 
or may implicate child custody.187  
Randolph’s protection of domestic privacy and reluctance to involve 
police officers in non-abusive domestic disputes may ultimately represent the 
optimal approach to Fourth Amendment consent law. But the Court’s 
adoption of prevailing social norms cuts short any discussion of the broader 
implications of its ruling. The Court privileges a norm of social behavior that 
was developed when gender relations were substantially different than they 
are today and when women’s rights to autonomy and bodily integrity in the 
domestic context were devalued.188 Endorsing norms simply because of their 
longstanding nature or general acceptance risks embedding discriminatory 
norms in constitutional law.  
3. Class-Discriminatory Norms  
Courts’ adoptions of existing social customs in Fourth Amendment law 
can also embed norms that systematically disadvantage poorer citizens and 
privilege those with more money or property. Class-discriminatory norms 
may also have racially disparate impacts, doubly disadvantaging poor people 
of color.189 The cases adopting these norms uncritically adopt prevailing 
social practices and entrench stereotypes about wealth and power.  
For example, while courts have held that individuals have a Fourth 
Amendment interest in the yards surrounding their detached homes or the 
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shared areas of small multi-unit homes,190 courts typically hold that the 
Fourth Amendment does not protect the hallways of larger apartment 
buildings.191 This distinction is based on courts’ perceptions of the social 
practices surrounding these areas. A homeowner “exercises greater control” 
over their yard than apartment dwellers do over their hallways, and, because 
larger apartments generally receive more visitors, the “more units in the 
apartment building … the less reasonable any expectation of privacy.”192 This 
might be a defensible assessment of social practices, although visitors and 
delivery people may intrude on a homeowner’s yard as well.193 But this 
distinction discriminates between those who own detached houses and those 
who cannot afford such houses (or simply wish to live in cities) and must 
share their living spaces with others. The former are likely wealthier, and they 
are given stronger privacy rights. Courts could just as plausibly find that all 
dwellings are surrounded by a private area, typically open to a limited set of 
guests and visitors, and off-limits to warrantless police surveillance.194 
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Instead, subtle distinctions between the social practices surrounding yards 
and hallways have driven the case outcomes, despite their disparate 
impacts.195  
The Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Delgado196 likewise enshrined 
class-discriminatory norms in the context of immigration enforcement at a 
garment factory.197 The Court concluded that placing armed agents near the 
factory’s exits did not constitute a seizure of the workers inside.198 This 
holding was based on the Court’s assessment of the typical social practices 
of a factory. It found that “when people are at work their freedom to move 
about has been meaningfully restricted … by the worker’s voluntary 
obligations to their employers.”199  While this may be an accurate assessment 
of the practices of many garment factories, where workers may have little 
bargaining power and may face excessive work demands and restrictions on 
personal breaks, it endorses an aggressively anti-worker norm.200 The 
rationale of Delgado is that workers are already obligated to remain inside the 
factory for the duration of the workday, with little enough personal freedom 
that the additional restrictions imposed by armed guards do not rise to the 
level of a Fourth Amendment seizure.201 The Court adopts this norm as a 
lodestar of Fourth Amendment law without questioning its appropriateness 
or desirability. In doing so, it reinforces disciplinary workplace norms and 
further undermines workers’ power relative to their employers. It also places 
disproportionate burdens on Latinx workers and may reduce their relative 
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status as workers.202 The Court’s adoption of existing workplace norms can 
have harmful legal and social implications for workers along several 
dimensions.  
B.  The Effects of Nonintervention 
The previous section discussed how courts applying the closure 
principle have ignored law’s role in nudging norms and entrenched in Fourth 
Amendment law unjust and outdated norms about race, gender, and 
socioeconomic status. The flip side of closure is nonintervention, where 
courts remain neutral when they perceive that social norms—particularly 
those about the uses of surveillance technologies—are still in flux. Judicial 
insistence on nonintervention where norms are perceived to be unsettled—
what we are calling the nonintervention principle—cedes power to private 
companies that design new technologies to surveil users rather than protect 
their privacy. The norms these companies favor are almost always surveillant, 
powered by the data-extractive business models of informational 
capitalism.203 In addition, nonintervention often permits the government to 
surveil individuals using new technologies for years or decades without 
meaningful legal regulation.  
1. Nonintervention and Government Surveillance 
In general, choosing not to act is a choice like any other. It has both 
consequences and moral valence, and reflects the normative judgment of the 
decisionmaker.204 Judicial nonintervention is also a choice, one that can 
perpetuate existing injustices.205 For example, judicial adherence to a 
decontextualized form of race and sex neutrality has often undermined 
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prospects for justice.206 Similarly, when courts stay out of the fray entirely, 
they may let political majorities entrench their own power at the expense of 
minority voters.207  
Proponents of judicial nonintervention in Fourth Amendment law 
suggest that courts should refrain from regulating the government’s use of a 
new surveillance technology until social norms and practices involving the 
technology become stable.208 Under this laissez faire regime, norms 
surrounding emerging technologies should be allowed to develop free of 
judicial input.209 A result of this is that government officials would be allowed 
to surveil citizens without Fourth Amendment regulation in the long interim 
period between the development of a new technology and the development 
of relatively stable social norms. As courts wait for a technology and its 
associated norms to settle, nonintervention in surveillance cases will typically 
mean declining to reach the merits of a Fourth Amendment issue, ruling 
narrowly, or, at the Supreme Court level, simply denying certiorari.210  
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This approach is problematic because norms rarely definitively settle,211 
and it may take several years or decades for technologies and norms to 
stabilize even partially.212 The period of “interpretive flexibility” surrounding 
a new technology is often quite long, as different social groups and actors 
fight to adapt new technologies to their needs, values, and worldviews. It 
took the bicycle nearly 100 years to evolve from its first iterations to suit the 
needs of different social groups.213 The telephone is still evolving.214 By the 
time sociotechnical norms stabilize, if they do at all, the government will have 
had free reign to surveil citizens for a long time.  
Proponents of nonintervention have argued that the Supreme Court’s 
erroneous ruling in Olmstead v. United States, which upheld warrantless 
wiretapping, was the result of the Court intervening too fast to rule on a 
relatively new form of surveillance.215 They suggest that the Court could 
instead have waited another twenty or thirty years as “the use of the 
telephone in communications continued to change throughout the 1930s, 
1940s, and 1950s.”216 But declining to intervene for several decades would 
have given the government the ability to massively surveil citizens without 
judicial supervision throughout that time, rendering the Fourth Amendment 
toothless.217 Moreover, both the telephone and the practice of wiretapping 
had been around and were well-known for decades prior to Olmstead.218 The 
 
Appeals “have no precedential value”).  
211 See supra Part II.A. 
212 See supra text accompanying notes 140–146. 
213 See BIJKER, supra note 145. 
214 See W.H. Martin, Seventy-Five Years of the Telephone: An Evolution in Technology, 30 BELL SYS. 
TECH. J. 215 (1951); Lisa Eadicicco, This Is Why the iPhone Upended the Tech Industry, TIME, 
June 29, 2017, https://time.com/4837176/iphone-10th-anniversary. 
215 Kerr, supra note 24, at 539. 
216 Id. 
217 Six years after Olmstead, Congress passed the Communications Act of 1934 which limited 
the disclosure of wiretapping evidence in court, but did not effectively deter widespread use 
and abuse of wiretapping over the following decades. See Communications Act of 1934, ch. 
652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064, 1104 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2006)); Matthew 
Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581, 592 (2011) (describing 
the widespread abuses that occurred the during the decades that followed the passage of the 
Communications Act of 1934). 
218 The telephone was patented in 1876, some fifty-two years prior to Olmstead, U.S. Patent 
No. 174,465 (issued Mar. 7, 1876), while wiretapping had been used since 1895, thirty-three 
years prior to Olmstead. Meyer Berger, Tapping the Wires, THE NEW YORKER, June 18, 1938. 





Court’s error in Olmstead was not the result of technological unfamiliarity or 
a failure to wait for norms to settle, but rather of excessive formalism and 
textual literalism.219  
By failing to intervene when issues of technological surveillance arise, 
courts would allow government surveillance to go unchecked by the Fourth 
Amendment for years or decades. Further, by the time sociotechnical norms 
become relatively stable, the government may have already moved on to a 
new surveillance practice, beginning the cycle again. As the next section 
explores, nonintervention can also facilitate the creation of anti-privacy 
norms by ceding norm development to private entities with business models 
built on data extraction. 
2. Informational Capitalism and Anti-Privacy Norms 
Courts’ absence from the social construction of new technologies 
amplifies designers’ power to set sociotechnical norms. Design can influence, 
nudge, and predetermine our disclosure behavior by triggering the heuristics 
we use to make decisions.220 When design makes things easier to do (like 
disclosing personal information), we do more of it; when design makes things 
harder to do (like protect our privacy), we do less of it.221 Design also 
expresses values, telling the stories designers want by controlling their 
technology’s “semantic architecture.”222  
Design is, in other words, a means of exercising power.223 As Woodrow 
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Hartzog notes, “[t]he realities of technology at scale mean that the services 
we use must necessarily be built in a way that constrains our choices.”224 We 
can only click on the buttons or select the options presented to us; we can 
only opt-out of the options from which a website allows us to opt-out.  
The power of design is generally leveraged to increase data collection, 
use, and processing. That is what “informational capitalism” refers to: a 
political economy where data equals profit.225 Scholars have argued that this 
need for data stems from the marketing industry’s quest to better predict 
consumer responses to advertisements. With the popularization of the World 
Wide Web, marketers sliced and diced populations into as many latent 
characteristics as possible so as to better “understand” what consumers 
want.226 Likewise, it is in the economic interests of tech industry executives 
to guide the design process toward surveillance. Executives at public 
companies also have legal obligations to pursue profits for shareholders, 
further incenting data extraction.227 For their part, many software engineers, 
a necessarily powerful group because of the position they occupy at the 
center of design’s translation from concept to code, are rarely trained in nor 
are particularly cognizant of privacy.228 The incentives and attitudes of those 
doing the work of design and those directing the process from the C-Suite 
prejudice design against privacy from the beginning. We see this throughout 
the digital ecosystem. Many smartphone apps collect geolocation data for no 
reason;229 interfaces encourage disclosure and frame sharing in a positive 
light;230 so-called “dark patterns” take advantage of our preference for shiny 
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colorful buttons over grey ones;231 platforms nudge us to buy products others 
have bought before us;232 and apps gamify sharing by encouraging us to 
continue a ‘streak’ with our friends.233  
In many cases, users have little power to react in ways contrary to or 
inconsistent with design.234 Design, therefore, is a powerful norm generator. 
As Hartzog explains, “[o]nce design affects our perceptions, it begins to 
shape our behavior. Once it shapes our behavior, it can be used to control 
us because it shapes what we perceive as ‘normal.’”235 Therefore, courts that 
adopt the nonintervention principle leave the arena in which social norms 
are contested to these powerful forces of design, almost all of which privilege 
surveillance over privacy.  
Technology companies also market their products to encourage 
sharing. Social platforms promise to “bring people together,” but only if 
users share their likes and dislikes.236 Dating apps advertise the most accurate 
matches, but only if users answer hundreds of intimate questions.237 The 
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multibillion-dollar femtech industry collects intimate data on its users and 
often sells that data to third parties, while marketing its products as 
enhancing women’s health and sexual enjoyment. And artificial intelligence 
companies market their algorithms with highly dubious claims of predictive 
accuracy, amplifying their “imperative” to collect data.238 
This has direct and deleterious effects on the ability of the Fourth 
Amendment to protect privacy. When courts decline to resolve Fourth 
Amendment cases on the merits because social norms are in flux, the norms 
that eventually emerge will not be neutral or organically developed by 
autonomous actors. Rather, those norms will be shaped by the companies 
that control product marketing and design, filtered through those companies’ 
profit-maximizing interests. Over time, the process of nonintervention, anti-
privacy norm formation, and judicial application of “settled” norms 
systematically biases social norms against privacy.   
We can observe a similar process unfolding in the lower courts. The 
Supreme Court has not yet weighed in on the privacy expectations, if any, 
associated with social media accounts such as Facebook. In the absence of 
clear direction, lower courts addressing the issue “have held that whether the 
Fourth Amendment applies to a user’s Facebook content depends, inter alia, 
on the user’s privacy settings.”239 In practice, courts have placed a burden of 
proof on defendants to demonstrate that their privacy settings are rigorous 
enough to justify Fourth Amendment protection.240 This would typically 
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require more than just restricting Facebook posts to one’s friends.241 But, 
over the past fifteen years, Facebook has notoriously made it difficult for its 
users to effectively use their privacy settings or limit the dissemination of 
their posts.242 Facebook’s anti-privacy design has thus helped to shape 
surveillance-relevant practices and norms. And there is little question about 
Facebook’s preferences for norms among its users—Mark Zuckerberg has 
stated explicitly that keeping personal information private online is no longer 
the “social norm.”243 The company has also consistently advanced the legal 
position that its users have no privacy interests in any information they share 
with Facebook.244 When the Supreme Court eventually weighs in on social 
media privacy, it will do so in an environment shaped by Facebook and its 
aggressively anti-privacy design and practices.  
C.  Surveillance Creep  
Judicial norm-reliance and nonintervention also facilitate the process of 
surveillance creep.245 Surveillance creep is related to the engineering concept 
“function creep,” where a device designed for one purpose ends up being 
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used for another purpose.246 Brett Frischmann and Evan Selinger give the 
example of a driver’s license, which grew from a permission card for drivers 
to a general form of identification.247  
Surveillance creep is a form of function creep that involves data 
collection. It occurs when a device designed for one type of information 
gathering ends up being used for other, often more invasive types of 
information gathering. For example, wearable health trackers like FitBit or 
Apple Watch may have originally been used to count steps, but they can also 
be deployed by health insurance companies, schools, or workplaces to 
determine eligibility for discounts, liability for injury, or access to 
opportunities. Integrating GPS into a mobile dating app can tell users about 
potential matches near them, but it can also be used to triangulate the precise 
location of queer people hiding from abusive communities, families, or 
governments.248 And a camera at a four-way intersection may have originally 
been installed to photograph the license plates of speeders or those who drive 
through red lights. But once the cameras are in place, it becomes easier for 
governments to use them to monitor pedestrians using facial recognition 
technology.  
Far from a hypothetical or speculative concern, these kinds of 
surveillance creep are already here. During anti-racism protests in May and 
June 2020, police in San Diego used streetlight sensors and cameras, 
previously installed to capture transit and environmental data, to identify, 
harass, and prosecute protestors.249 And once an isolated security tool, face 
scans are now being used in place of boarding passes at airports, with the 
attendant databases of faces providing even more opportunities for 
surveillance.250 Existing tracking tools being repurposed for Covid-related 
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contact tracing are another example of ever-expanding surveillance.251 
Surveillance creep has a subtle yet powerful impact on sociotechnical 
norms because of its ability to normalize surveillance as ordinary, routine, 
and expected. Data tracking in schools may offer administrators quantitative 
metrics on which to evaluate student success, but its use habituates young 
people to third-party data collection.252 The launch of facial recognition 
cameras in London prepares the ground for “wider public acceptance of a 
… rights-hostile technology via a gradual building out process.”253 GPS 
technology may be helpful for tourists navigating new cities or to help drivers 
find the fastest route home, but it also routinizes the experience of other 
people knowing where you are at all times and adjusts our expectations about 
others’ access to our data.254 It is also relatively easy for information age 
devices to take on new surveillance capabilities: tablets, wearables, mobile 
apps, and so-called “smart” devices can be updated via wireless uploads in 
the background while no one is looking.255 This contrasts with the significant 
effort involved in updating industrial age devices; installing a CD player or 
an airbag or a sunroof in an old car, for example, required a trip to a repair 
shop, physical deconstruction, and reconstruction. Whereas the obvious 
effort involved in the latter emphasized the significance of the change, the 
ease of the former suggests its ordinariness.  
By relying on precedents involving older technologies to justify the use 
of newer, more advanced surveillance, courts unwittingly leverage the 
normalization effect of surveillance creep in Fourth Amendment cases. For 
 




251 Andy Greenberg, Does Covid-19 Contact Tracing Pose a Privacy Risk? Your Questions, Answered, 
WIRED (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.wired.com/story/apple-google-contact-tracing-
strengths-weaknesses. 
252 FRISCHMANN & SELINGER, supra note 245, at 21. 
253 Natasha Lomas, London’s Met Police Switches on Live Facial Recognition, Flying in Face of Human 
Rights Concerns, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 24, 2020), 
https://techcrunch.com/2020/01/24/londons-met-police-switches-on-live-facial-
recognition-flying-in-face-of-human-rights-concerns. 
254 FRISCHMANN & SELINGER, supra note 245, at 21. 
255 These products are “tethered” and, therefore, easy to update. Chris Hoofnagle, Aniket 





example, in United States v. White,256 the Supreme Court ruled that undercover 
agents could record private conversations inside a suspect’s home, relying on 
prior rulings permitting undercover agents without recording devices to enter 
a home.257 Because the additional intrusion of a recording device was 
relatively small, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy against it.258 
Once one form of surveillance got its foot in the door of people’s homes, 
additional surveillance became easier to justify.  
In United States v. Forrester,259 the Ninth Circuit held that government 
agents could monitor an individual’s internet account and capture his email 
to/from data, the IP addresses of the websites he visited, and the total 
volume of data sent to his account.260 A prior case had allowed the police to 
use a device known as a “pen register” to tap a suspect’s phone lines and 
collect the numbers that he dialed.261 Given the legality of telephone pen 
registers, the government could “install a pen register analogue” to monitor 
a person’s internet traffic without triggering the Fourth Amendment.262 The 
court ignored the substantially greater quantity and intimacy of internet 
data,263 concluding instead that internet users do not reasonably expect 
privacy in their internet use any more than they do in their telephone use.264 
In each of these cases, the Court’s approval of early forms of 
surveillance was used to justify the subsequent use of more advanced forms 
of surveillance. The Court presumed that individuals had accepted 
surveillance as normal, and then allowed government monitoring to creep 
one step further. 
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IV. NEW DIRECTIONS FOR LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 
Courts’ reliance on existing norms, and failure to intervene in cases 
where norms are unsettled, have led to several substantial errors in Fourth 
Amendment law. That is not to say that norms have no place in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. But rather than simply adopting existing norms, 
courts should examine whether those norms are justifiable. And whether 
courts choose to get involved in the social construction of surveillance 
technologies or to stay out of the fray, they must do so appreciating the net 
surveillant effects of nonintervention. 
Sociotechnical norms develop in an arena already skewed in favor of 
surveillance. When courts avoid intervening where norms are in flux, the 
mechanisms of design and surveillance creep remain in place. It is true that 
technology companies are not the only institutions involved in the social 
construction of new technologies. But they are the most powerful: Scholars 
have shown that individuals are, on average, ill-equipped to resist designed-
in nudges on their own,265 and the community of privacy advocacy 
organizations are too small and underfunded to match the power of 
corporate interests. The law’s intervention down the line can only do so 
much, tweaking or adjusting a marginal change even as the wave of pro-
surveillance norms continue unchallenged. Instead, if the goal is to achieve 
an equilibrium between privacy and law enforcement needs, sociotechnical 
norms need a counterweight.266 
Courts are well-suited to provide this counterweight. Although 
courts’ institutional interests are manifold,267 those interests are generally not 
the same as the data-extractive interests of technology companies. Courts are 
also capable of stepping back, conceptualizing the balance between law 
enforcement and liberty, and making a dispassionate decision in keeping with 
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what Daniel Meltzer once called the “special attributes of the judiciary.”268 
And courts are capable of protecting the rights of minority groups that lack 
sufficient voices in majoritarian politics.269 By questioning the 
appropriateness of “settled” norms and intervening to protect citizens faced 
with new data-extractive technologies, courts may serve as a valuable 
counterweight to the anti-privacy interests of governments and technology 
companies. 
In the following sections, we explore new directions for Fourth 
Amendment law that can help courts to intervene effectively in cases 
involving new technologies and avoid excessive norm reliance. We first 
examine the use of alternative Fourth Amendment paradigms that would 
allow courts to focus on the effects of surveillance rather than existing social 
norms. In addition, we propose that courts use a modified form of stare 
decisis in Fourth Amendment cases involving emerging surveillance 
technologies, a field in which new approaches may be needed more often 
than in other areas of constitutional law.270 Finally, we survey alternative 
institutional arrangements for regulating government surveillance and 
consider how legislatures, administrative agencies, and courts might work 
together to effectively regulate government surveillance.  
A.  New Fourth Amendment Paradigms 
Courts rely on existing social norms in virtually every aspect of Fourth 
Amendment law, as they seek objective bases for their rulings on surveillance 
and policing. Dominant doctrinal paradigms facilitate this reliance on norms. 
The Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test and the reasonableness-based 
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standards for investigative stops and non-physical seizures encourage courts 
to act as armchair sociologists, identifying and analyzing common social 
practices. 
There are, however, alternative paradigms that would largely avoid 
reliance on social norms. In place of the reasonable expectation of privacy 
standard for searches, scholars have proposed approaches that are more 
prescriptive and that focus on the effects of surveillance rather than its social 
valence.  These include tests that overtly balance the chilling effects and 
psychological harms of surveillance against its benefits,271 multi-factor tests 
that identify constitutionally problematic forms of government 
observation,272 and tests that focus on the intimacy, amount, and cost of a 
given act of surveillance.273 Scholars have also suggested alternative 
paradigms for Fourth Amendment reasonableness, including graduated tiers 
of reasonableness that offer a more nuanced approach to different kinds of 
government surveillance,274 or partially randomized searches that reduce 
police discretion and racial discrimination.275  
By directly examining the effects or intensity of surveillance, and not 
just its acceptance by society, these prescriptive approaches can lessen 
reliance on social norms in Fourth Amendment law.276 Prescriptive 
paradigms for Fourth Amendment searches are also more compatible with 
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early judicial interventions addressing new surveillance technologies, because 
they are more adaptable to rapidly changing circumstances.277  Moreover, 
many of these paradigms can help courts better address surveillance creep.278 
Rather than relying on sociotechnical norms, these paradigms focus on the 
broader impacts of government surveillance activities. As such, whether a 
surveillance practice uses familiar infrastructure matters less under these 
approaches than under norm-reliant paradigms.279 These approaches can 
accordingly help avoid the normalizing effects of incremental surveillance 
expansion.  
In addition, courts adopting prescriptive approaches to Fourth 
Amendment law can take the possibility of surveillance creep into account 
when assessing a new surveillance technology. If a new technology 
establishes a surveillance infrastructure that could easily be used for 
additional types of information gathering, that should weigh in favor of 
stronger Fourth Amendment regulation of the technology.280 For example, if 
license plate reading cameras, which may not themselves capture very 
sensitive data, could be repurposed to collect facial recognition data or 
infrared scans of car interiors, that should be a factor in a court’s decision to 
approve the cameras. Because additional uses of existing infrastructure are 
difficult to monitor, courts may be more effective at limiting the 
development of pervasive surveillance infrastructure in the first instance.281     
Of course, these types of forward-looking assessments of surveillance 
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technologies may be difficult for courts, which are often limited in their 
technical knowledge and institutional capacity for balancing complex 
factors.282 Moreover, the conservative ideological tilt of the federal courts 
might skew judicial decisions in favor of law enforcement interests.283 As we 
discuss in Part IV.C, another way to proactively address surveillance creep is 
to explore alternative institutional structures for surveillance regulation. 
B. Flexibility and Stare Decisis 
Several current Supreme Court Justices have put forth theories about 
stare decisis and when it should dictate case outcomes.284 While the power of 
stare decisis to actually bind Justices is contested,285 the Court stands by its 
precedents far more often than it overrules them.286 The force of precedent 
can deter the Justices from questioning prior erroneous decisions,287 
influence the Court’s grants of certiorari,288 and shape the cases that litigants 
appeal to the Court in the first place.289  
Whatever its general power, stare decisis may be disfavored in certain 
situations, such as when a prior decision has proven unworkable,290 or when 
individuals are unlikely to rely on a prior decision in allocating resources.291 
Our analysis above suggests another area in which judges should be especially 
willing to overturn existing precedents: cases involving surveillance 
technologies and related social practices. Courts should be willing to 
intervene when government entities employ a novel technology, even if the 
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norms and practices surrounding the technology remain in flux.292 But given 
the possibility of judicial error in such cases, courts should embed flexibility 
in their Fourth Amendment decisions.293 They should recognize that 
changing technological and social circumstances often necessitate overruling 
prior cases in this area.294  
Judicial opinions might explicitly point towards flexibility by stating that 
their decisions may not apply if certain circumstances change.295 But the 
future of technology and social norm development is difficult to predict.296 
A better approach might simply be to recognize that judicial precedents 
involving surveillance technology may require reexamination when 
circumstances shift or when courts have the benefit of hindsight.297 Relatedly, 
the Supreme Court could facilitate challenges to Fourth Amendment 
precedents by making clear that a defendant who successfully overturns a 
precedent will be able to exclude evidence gathered in reliance on the 
overturned decision.298 Limiting the “good faith” exception for officers who 
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rely on existing law may be necessary to incentivize litigants to challenge 
questionable precedents.299   
Lower courts, too, should be empowered to take account of changing 
circumstances or unworkable higher-court decisions in the Fourth 
Amendment context. Lower courts sometimes apply binding precedents 
narrowly, shaping the law’s application and signaling to appellate courts that 
a precedent may be erroneous or otherwise flawed.300 This “precedential 
dialogue” should be encouraged in the Fourth Amendment context, where 
early interventions by higher courts may require revision over time.301 
Appeals courts can monitor lower court narrowing and use it to identify 
precedents ripe for reexamination.302 They might also encourage 
experimentation by expressly stating that lower courts will have a role in 
implementing a new standard or by citing lower court disagreements in 
opinions overturning prior decisions.303 By embedding flexibility in their 
decisions involving new technologies, courts can intervene to shape 
sociotechnical norms and prevent unchecked government surveillance while 
minimizing judicial errors over time.   
C.  Alternative Institutional Structures  
A growing body of scholarship argues that new legislative approaches 
and administrative structures can help courts govern the sprawling 
surveillance systems of law enforcement.304 Daphna Renan has suggested 
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that an independent administrative agency—like a more robust Privacy and 
Civil Liberties Board—can make a “programmatic probable cause 
determination” that situates a given incident of a search or seizure within the 
wider ecosystem of law enforcement surveillance.305 This would allow 
standardized procedures and built-in expertise, the hallmarks of a functioning 
administrative state, to put limits on surveillance at the systems stage. 
Administrative rules can also supplement the judiciary’s efforts to nudge 
sociotechnical norms by adding an additional “point of entry” for law—
judicial review “at the level of program design.”306 This allows the law to use 
its expressive power not just on a single incident of surveillance, but also on 
the structures that support it. 
To implement this, scholars suggest that courts direct their decisions to 
policymakers, calling on them to write rules that prevent recurring injustice 
in addition to speaking directly to police on the ground.307 Such a structure 
could combine the prophylactic rules of cases like Miranda v. Arizona308 with 
broader directives to legislatures to change police procedures, as seen in cases 
like United States v. Wade.309 This could represent a sea change in how courts 
frame their opinions,310 and there are epistemic and practical reasons why 
calling on policymakers to write prescriptive rules might help courts act as 
counterweights to anti-privacy norms. Agencies may have greater expertise, 
particularly regarding the whole picture of law enforcement’s surveillance 
systems, than common law courts making one-off decisions every once in a 
while.311 Agencies can also write prescriptive rules and engage in nimble 
policy experimentation, allowing them to adjust proposals as they observe 
the downstream consequences of their actions.312  
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Lawmakers can also shape social norms relevant to privacy by 
influencing corporate behavior. This is at least one of the goals of the General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the European Union’s comprehensive 
data protection law.313 It provides EU citizens with a litany of rights to their 
data, including rights to access, correct, delete, and transport their data, 
among others.314 In addition, the GDPR imposes procedural and compliance 
obligations on companies as they collect and process data from their 
customers. Companies have to hire Data Protection Officers (DPOs) to 
oversee and ensure corporate compliance with the law.315 They also have to 
keep extensive data processing records, which can be requisitioned by 
regulators during an investigation.316 And, in certain circumstances, the 
GDPR requires regulated organizations to conduct impact assessments 
about data processing and collection and platform design.317 These internal 
requirements are supposed to give companies a standard protocol for 
assessing privacy risks. But, as Margot Kaminski suggests, they are also 
supposed to affect how companies conceptualize their data privacy 
obligations, nudging them by keeping privacy front of mind during the design 
and compliance processes.318 
This form of “collaborative governance” is incomplete. It allows 
regulated entities to be directly involved in the creation, interpretation, and 
application of what the law actually requires, undermining the law’s ability to 
achieve its social ends.319 Nor are administrative agencies likely to effectively 
regulate surveillance on their own; agencies can be politicized and subject to 
regulatory capture.320 But agencies need not work alone. An effective system 
of governance requires agencies, legislatures, and the courts: the former two 
can write rules while engaged with a systemic review of the criminal justice 
system, and the latter can apply judicial review to those rules.321 This 
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collaboration can offer additional means through which regulatory power can 
counterbalance technologies’ designed-in surveillance norms.  
CONCLUSION 
Prevailing social norms often determine the direction of Fourth 
Amendment law. Courts and scholars have lauded norm reliance as judicial 
humility in the face of rapidly changing technology. This Article has 
challenged that conventional wisdom in two respects. It has shown that the 
practice of judicial reliance on social norms is more nuanced than previously 
understood: courts rely on them when they appear to have settled, but decline 
to get involved when social norms, particularly those about new surveillance 
technologies, are still being contested. This Article has also shown how 
current adjudicative paradigms undermine the promise of the Fourth 
Amendment. By adopting existing norms without questioning whether they 
are justifiable, courts have embedded discriminatory concepts in Fourth 
Amendment law. And nonintervention leaves sociotechnical norms to 
develop in accordance with the data extractive interests of technology 
companies. As courts remain on the sidelines, our privacy slips away: we 
become inured to the perceived normalcy of surveillance practices, and new 
technologies creep more and more toward surveillance. Whether we can 
reverse course with new judicial and institutional approaches is an open 
question. But we can start by understanding the risks of the Fourth 
Amendment’s current relationship with social norms and envisioning a 
different path. 
 
